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HIV AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITY:  
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF MABIOR AND DC 
Kevin Rawluk* 
I. Introduction 
This paper will critically evaluate the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) recent 
decisions in Mabior1 and DC.2 These cases concern an HIV positive person’s obli-
gation to disclose his or her status before engaging in sexual intercourse. More 
fundamentally, these cases illustrate how myths and misunderstandings continue 
to inform sexual assault law.  
In Mabior, the Court held that an HIV positive individual has to disclose that 
status before sexual intercourse if there is a “realistic possibility that HIV will be 
transmitted.”3 The obligation is entirely on those living with HIV. There is no cor-
responding duty to ask about HIV status.4 The Court’s decision in DC is significant 
because it implicitly sanctions revenge prosecutions that could discourage those 
with HIV from leaving abusive relationships or otherwise exercising their personal 
autonomy to end relationships. 
I will argue that the SCC’s decisions in Mabior and DC are flawed because of 
their focus on risk of harm and their failure to recognize joint obligations to ask 
about and to disclose HIV status. It should not matter whether HIV non-disclosure 
exposed the complainant to a risk of harm; instead the focus should be on whether 
non-disclosure deprived the complainant of her right to choose how to exercise her 
sexuality.5 This paper argues for an autonomy-based approach to the knowing 
non-disclosure of HIV status. While a unilateral disclosure obligation can be de-
fended, it does little to combat the stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS and assumes an 
impoverished view of human agency and sexual integrity. The preferable approach 
is one based on shared responsibility. The law should impose a parallel obligation 
to ask partners about their HIV status. This duty to ask operates alongside the duty 
                                                                                                                                                         
* Articling Student 2013-2014, Crown Law Office – Criminal. Juris Doctor 2013 – Osgoode Hall Law 
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1 R v Mabior, 2012 SCC 47, [2012] SCJ No 47 [Mabior]. 
2 R v DC, 2012 SCC 48, [2012] SCJ No 48 [DC]. 
3 Mabior, supra note 1 at paras 4, 91, 104.  
4 Ibid at paras 61-65.  
5 See generally Carissima Mathen & Michael Plaxton, “HIV, Consent and Criminal Wrongs” (2011) 57 
Crim LQ 464 [HIV and Criminal Wrongs].  
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to disclose. Courts will not uphold either duty in situations where it would be un-
reasonable to do so.  
This paper begins by critically evaluating the SCC’s decisions in Mabior and 
DC. I will explain why Mabior’s focus on risk of transmission is flawed. I will argue 
that an autonomy-based approach is more consistent with the policy underlying 
the criminalization of (sexual) assault and the jurisprudence on consent. I will con-
clude by explaining why parallel obligations to ask about and to disclose HIV status 
are preferable to a unilateral disclosure obligation.  
II. HIV and risk: Discussion of Mabior and DC  
Section 265(3)(c) of the Criminal Code provides that “no consent is obtained 
where the complainant submits or does not resist by reason of…fraud.”6 
In Cuerrier, the SCC held that the failure to disclose HIV status to a sexual 
partner could constitute fraud, vitiating consent.7 To vitiate consent to a sexual 
activity, the Crown has to prove that:  
1. the accused lied about or failed to disclose his HIV status;  
2. the complainant would not have consented to the sexual activity had 
she known about the accused’s HIV positive status; and 
3. the accused’s dishonesty exposed the complainant to a “significant risk 
of serious bodily harm.”8 
The SCC was asked to reconsider Cuerrier in Mabior and DC.9  
(i)  R v Mabior; R v DC 
In Mabior, the accused had sex with nine complainants without disclosing his 
HIV positive status. The accused told one of the complainants that he did not have 
any sexually transmitted infections. There was evidence that the accused had a low 
viral load and used condoms inconsistently. None of the complainants contracted 
HIV. Eight of them testified that they would not have had sex with the accused had 
they known about his HIV status.10 
The trial judge and Manitoba Court of Appeal came to different conclusions 
about what constitutes a “significant risk of serious bodily harm” under Cuerrier. 
The trial judge held that an HIV positive individual does not have to disclose when 
his or her viral loads are undetectable and a condom is used.11 The Court of Appeal 
disagreed and held that an HIV positive individual does not have to disclose when 
he or she has a low viral load or a condom is used.12 
                                                                                                                                                         
6 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 265(3)(c) [Criminal Code]. 
7 R v Cuerrier, [1998] 2 SCR 371 at paras 124-125, [1998] SCJ No 64 [Cuerrier]. 
8 Ibid at paras 124-130. See also Mabior, supra note 1 at para 12.  
9 Mabior, supra note 1 at para 13.  
10 Ibid at paras 5-9. 
11 R v Mabior, 2008 MBQB 201 at paras 113-117, 134-137, [2008] MJ No 277.  
12 Mabior, supra note 1 at para 9.  
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The SCC affirmed that an individual can be found guilty of aggravated sexual 
assault for not having disclosed his or her HIV positive status before intercourse.13 
While recognizing that Cuerrier has been subject to criticism, the Court concluded 
that its focus on the risk of harm is correct.14 The Court decided to keep the general 
approach under Cuerrier but attempted to clarify when HIV non-disclosure would 
create a “significant risk of serious bodily harm.”15 The Court held that this re-
quirement is met and disclosure is required if there is a “realistic possibility” that 
HIV will be transmitted.16 An HIV positive person does not have to disclose before 
vaginal intercourse where he or she has a low viral load and a condom is used be-
cause then there is no realistic possibility of transmission.17  
In DC, the accused and complainant had sex on one occasion before she dis-
closed her HIV positive status.18 The accused’s viral load was undetectable at that 
time.19 The accused claimed that a condom was used, while the complainant said 
that it was not. After disclosure, the two entered into a four-year relationship. They 
lived together and had protected and unprotected sex. The complainant did not 
contract HIV. In December 2004, the accused tried to end the relationship. The 
complainant refused to leave the family home and assaulted the accused and her 
son when they tried to pick up their belongings. The complainant was convicted of 
assault. In February 2005, the complainant went to the police about the accused’s 
initial non-disclosure. The accused was charged with sexual assault and aggravated 
assault.20  
The trial judge convicted the accused on both charges because he found that a 
condom was not used during the relevant sexual encounter.21 The Quebec Court of 
Appeal overturned the convictions and held that there was no significant risk of 
serious bodily harm because the accused’s viral load was undetectable at the time.22  
The SCC applied Mabior and would have restored the conviction on the basis 
that an HIV positive person needs to disclose unless his or her viral loads are low 
and a condom is used. However, the trial judge erred in concluding that a condom 
was not used. Accordingly, the Crown’s appeal was dismissed.23 
(ii)  Discussion 
Mabior effectively (re)introduces implied or constructive consent into Canadi-
an sexual assault law. In Ewanchuk, the SCC held that the absence of consent is 
determined by the complainant’s subjective state of mind.24 The Court unequivo-
cally rejected that there could be implied consent to sexual touching.25 These 
                                                                                                                                                         
13 Ibid at para 4. 
14 Ibid at paras 13, 57-58. 
15 Ibid at paras 60, 81-82.  
16 Ibid at paras 91-92.  
17 Ibid at paras 94-104.  
18 DC, supra note 2 at para 9.  
19 Ibid at paras 2, 29.  
20 Ibid at paras 4-7. 
21 Ibid at para 15. 
22 Ibid at para 2. 
23 Ibid at paras 29-30.  
24 R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330 at paras 26-27, [1999] SCJ No 10 [Ewanchuk].  
25 Ibid at paras 31, 87, 103. 
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holdings were recently affirmed in JA.26 In his dissenting opinion in JA, Justice Fish 
emphasized that the law governing consent is meant to protect personal autonomy. 
It should not be used to undermine personal autonomy by limiting an individual’s 
freedom to choose whom to have sex with and under what circumstances. Simply 
put, the law should not make the choice for an individual about which sexual activ-
ities he or she will consent to.27 Instead of protecting personal autonomy, Mabior 
deems consent where judicially defined thresholds of harm are not met.  
Contrary to Ewanchuk and JA, Mabior implies or imputes consent to the com-
plainant where there is no realistic possibility that HIV will be transmitted. If there 
is no realistic possibility of transmission, it does not matter that the accused’s fraud 
induced the complainant’s consent. Mabior will allow courts to find that a com-
plainant legally “consented” to sex with an HIV positive person, while 
simultaneously finding that she did not actually consent.28 In situations where a 
condom was used during vaginal intercourse and the accused had a low viral load, 
the complainant’s subjective consent is rendered legally irrelevant. In this way, the 
Court’s approach in Mabior is comparable to that in Cuerrier. Elizabeth Sheehy 
and Christine Boyle analogized the latter to “telling a person who has been subject-
ed to a non consensual surgical procedure that even though she would not have 
consented to it, the procedure did not do her any harm.”29 
In addition, the Court’s insistence on condom use means that the disclosure 
obligation bears more heavily on women. Indeed, the rule in Mabior may have cre-
ated a “de facto” disclosure obligation for women in heterosexual relationships.30 
While men with low viral loads can choose to wear condoms and avoid disclosing, 
women with low viral loads have to convince their male partners to use a condom 
or be forced to disclose. Women are not always in a position to require condom 
use. The same can be said for men in some homosexual relationships. In some situ-
ations, those with HIV may be subjected to violence if they insist on condom use or 
if they disclose.31 Mabior asks these people to choose between a risk of immediate 
violence and a risk of criminal prosecution for aggravated (sexual) assault. If the 
Court is going to insist on condom use, it should provide the accused with a de-
fence where it is established that he or she did not require condom use or 
disclosure because of a reasonable fear of violence.32 The problem with the Court’s 
analysis in Mabior is that it severed legal principles from social context and failed 
                                                                                                                                                         
26 R v JA, 2011 SCC 28 at paras 45-47, 57, [2011] 2 SCR 440 [JA].  
27 Ibid at para 72. 
28 Addressing Cuerrier: Elizabeth Sheehy & Christine Boyle, “Justice L’Heureux-Dubé and Canadian 
Sexual Assault Law: Resisting the Privatization of Rape,” in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Adding Feminism to 
Law: The Contributions of Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004) 247 at 263 [Adding 
Feminism to Law].  
29 Ibid at 265.  
30 Carissima Mathen, “R v Mabior; R v DC,” Slaw (October 5, 2012), online: <http://www.slaw.ca/2012/ 
10/05/r-v-mabior-r-v-dc>. 
31 Samantha Ryan, “Risk-Taking, Recklessness and HIV Transmission: Accommodating the Reality of 
Sexual Transmission of HIV within a Justifiable Approach to Criminal Liability” (2007) 28 Liverpool LR 
215 at 239-241 [Risk-Taking and HIV Transmission]. See also Emily MacKinnon & Constance Cromp-
ton, “The Gender of Lying: Feminist Perspectives on the Non-Disclosure of HIV Status” (2012) 45:2 
UBC L Rev 407 at 440-441 [Gender of Lying]. 
32 Risk-Taking and HIV Transmission, supra note 31 at 239-242.  
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to consider the issues in light of the gendered power imbalances in sexual relation-
ships. 
As an application of Mabior, the SCC’s reasons in DC do not add very much to 
the substantive discussion around HIV non-disclosure and consent. However, DC 
is more important for what the Court does not say. The Court failed to comment 
on charge screening and whether the Crown should have proceeded with this pros-
ecution in the first place. This omission implicitly sanctions revenge prosecutions 
that could discourage those with HIV from leaving abusive relationships or other-
wise exercising their personal autonomy to end relationships.  
The Crown should not have proceeded with the prosecution in DC. The “vic-
tim” did not seem to be complaining about the one time he was unknowingly 
exposed to HIV. His complaint appeared to be about punishing the accused for 
ending their relationship and for reporting his domestic violence to the police. The 
complainant did not report the accused’s non-disclosure once he found out about 
it. He came forward after a four-year relationship with the accused had ended. 
During that relationship he had protected and unprotected sex with the accused, 
even though he knew about her HIV positive status. The complainant only came 
forward after he was convicted of assaulting the accused and her son when she 
tried to end the relationship. Even the trial judge saw that there was an “aura of 
vengeance” around the complaint.33  
The Crown’s decision to prosecute was not supported by charge screening 
principles. The facts in DC should have led the Crown to conclude that the chances 
of conviction were too low to justify proceeding.34 The Crown had to prove that, 
notwithstanding the subsequent four year sexual relationship, the complainant 
would not have consented to the initial sexual encounter had he known about the 
accused’s HIV status.35 On these facts the Court should have emphasized the im-
portance of charge screening in situations of HIV non-disclosure and cautioned 
that the threat of criminal prosecution should not become a way to keep vulnerable 
people in unwanted relationships. 
Mabior and DC leave important questions for those living with HIV unan-
swered. After Mabior, it is clear that a person has to disclose his or her HIV 
positive status before vaginal intercourse unless he or she has a low viral load and a 
condom is used. However, the Court failed to provide any such guidance with re-
spect to oral or anal sex.36 The Court also failed to clarify an HIV positive person’s 
disclosure obligations where he or she has a low viral load and a condom is used 
but breaks during vaginal intercourse. Thus, for many living with HIV, the uncer-
                                                                                                                                                         
33 DC, supra note 2 at paras 4-7, 9, 12.  
34 In Quebec, like in Ontario, the Crown can only proceed with charges if the evidence satisfies an objec-
tive threshold related to the probability of conviction. In Ontario, there has to be a “reasonable prospect 
of conviction.” See Ontario, Ministry of Attorney General, Crown Policy Manual, “Charge Screening” 
(March 21, 2005) at 1-2. The charge screening standard in Quebec is even more stringent. See Québec, 
Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales, “Accusation – Poursuite des Procédures” (March 31, 
2009) at § 6. See also Steven Penny, Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, Criminal Procedure in 
Canada (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2011) at 449-450.  
35 Cuerrier, supra note 7 at para 130. See also Mabior, supra note 1 at paras 12, 104. 
36 Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, “HIV non-disclosure and the criminal law: An analysis of two 
recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada” (2012) at 1, 8, online: <http://www.aidslaw.ca/ 
publications/interfaces/downloadFile.php?ref=2083>. 
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tainty caused by Cuerrier’s requirement of “significant risk of serious bodily harm” 
continues to persist. 
III. HIV and shared responsibility: The duty to ask and the duty to disclose 
(i)  HIV non-disclosure should vitiate consent where it induces consent 
The assault provisions in the Criminal Code are meant to protect and promote 
an individual’s personal autonomy by recognizing his or her right to control who 
has access to their body and under what circumstances.37 It follows that fraud 
should vitiate consent under section 265(3)(c) of the Criminal Code, where the 
accused’s dishonesty has the effect of negating the complainant’s autonomous will 
and inducing her into physical contact that she would not have otherwise consent-
ed to.38  
In Mabior, the SCC affirmed that the focus should be on the risk of harm in de-
termining whether non-disclosure of HIV status vitiates consent.39 Mabior held 
that non-disclosure could vitiate consent where there is a “realistic possibility of 
transmission of HIV.”40 As Justice L’Heureux-Dubé explained in her concurring 
reasons in Cuerrier, focusing on the risk of harm misses the point and resurrects 
discredited myths and understandings of sexual assault:  
Limiting the definition of fraud in the sexual assault context … [to 
where there is a risk of harm] is to potentially fall into the same trap as 
those people who believe that rape in the absence of physical “violence,” 
where the complainant just froze and did not fight back or was uncon-
scious, is not a serious crime. The essence of the offence [of assault] … is 
not the presence of physical violence or the potential for serious bodily 
harm, but the violation of the complainant's physical dignity in a man-
ner contrary to her autonomous will. That violation of physical dignity 
and personal autonomy is what justifies criminal sanction, and always 
has, irrespective of the risk or degree of bodily harm involved.41 
In Cuerrier, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé proposed an autonomy-based approach 
for determining when fraud vitiates consent under section 265(3)(c) of the Crimi-
nal Code. In her view, the Crown must prove that:  
1. the accused acted in an objectively dishonest manner; 
2. the complainant would not have consented to the physical contact ab-
sent the dishonesty; and  
                                                                                                                                                         
37 Cuerrier, supra note 7 at paras 11-12, 15. See also Ewanchuk, supra note 24 at para 28. 
38 Cuerrier, supra note 7 at para 16.  
39 Mabior, supra note 1 at paras 58, 93 
40 Ibid at paras 91, 104. 
41 Cuerrier, supra note 7 at para 19.  
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3. the accused was aware that his dishonesty would induce the complain-
ant to consent to the physical contact. 42 
Although the principles behind Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s test are sound, I 
would clarify the first element. The first requirement should read “whether a rea-
sonable person would have realized that the [concealed or misrepresented] fact was 
important to the complainant’s decision to agree to the physical contact.”43 If the 
reasonable person would have realized that it was, lying about that fact or failing to 
disclose it would be objectively dishonest. 
In Cuerrier, the rest of the Court was concerned that Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s 
broad conception of fraud would overextend the criminal law. Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé’s approach expands criminal liability for fraudulent (sexual) assault, but not 
past its proper limits. The subjective-objective elements of the test serve as im-
portant constraints on its potential scope. If a reasonable person would have 
realized that the concealed or misrepresented fact was important to the complain-
ant’s decision to engage in the sexual activity and the accused actually knew that it 
was, I fail to see any reason as to why criminal liability should not attach when that 
fraud causes the complainant to consent to something that she otherwise would 
not have. 
This understanding of fraud is consistent with the need to protect personal au-
tonomy that underlies the criminalization of assault44 and the Court’s approach to 
consent in Ewanchuk, which “ties consent not to objective and external legal stand-
ards of what society will accept as consent, but to the complainant’s subjective and 
perhaps idiosyncratic perceptions.”45 Mabior fails to adequately protect a person’s 
right to choose whom to have sex with and under what circumstances, and cannot 
be reconciled with Ewanchuk. 
For these reasons, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s model should determine when 
fraud vitiates consent and when an HIV positive individual has to disclose his or 
her status to a sexual partner. 
(ii)  Shared responsibility is preferable to unilateral disclosure obligation  
It is possible to defend Mabior’s one-sided disclosure obligation on HIV posi-
tive individuals. Sexual assault is seen as “wrong” because it “objectifies” the victim. 
The perpetrator treats the victim as an object to be used, rather than as an autono-
mous being in charge of her own sexuality and with her own goals, needs and 
desires.46 Carissima Mathen and Michael Plaxton argue that HIV non-disclosure 
results in this same kind of objectification:  
                                                                                                                                                         
42 Ibid at para 16. Hamish Stewart attempted to reconcile the SCC’s reasoning in Cuerrier, R v Williams, 
2003 SCC 41, [2003] 2 SCR 134 and Ewanchuk and essentially proposed Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s test 
for when fraud should vitiate consent. See Hamish Stewart, “When Does Fraud Vitiate Consent? A 
Comment on R v Williams” (2004-2005) 49 Crim LQ 144 at 155-157 [When Does Fraud Vitiate Con-
sent]. 
43 When Does Fraud Vitiate Consent, supra note 42 at 155-156.  
44 Hamish Stewart, Sexual Offences in Canadian Law, loose-leaf (Release No 9, July 2012), (Aurora, Ont: 
Canada Law Book, 2004), ch 3 at 3-20 [Sexual Offences in Canadian Law]. 
45 Kent Roach, Criminal Law, 4th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009) at 97.  
46 HIV and Criminal Wrongs, supra note 5 at 481.  
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To automatically proceed on the basis that one’s partner is not invested 
in her own health and well-being, and is therefore willing to make her-
self sexually available in spite of obvious risks … effectively denies that 
one’s partner has any meaningful autonomy in any sphere, not just in 
the instant sexual context.47  
Thus, there is a strong argument that HIV non-disclosure is like any other sex-
ual assault. Accordingly, the burden for preventing this type of assault should fall 
solely on the potential perpetrator.  
However, the emphasis on personal autonomy that animates Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé’s model does not fit comfortably with a unilateral disclosure obli-
gation. To the extent that Mabior engages with questions of personal autonomy, it 
is focused on the use of one person by another.48 This ultimately finds expression 
in its affirmation of a one-sided disclosure obligation. While the language of a per-
son being deprived of his or her sexual autonomy by the fraud of another is 
compelling, it is based on a particular conception of autonomy and sexuality that 
may not be entirely accurate or desirable. In her concurring opinion in Cuerrier, 
Justice McLachlin was sensitive to this dynamic and held that “the equation of 
non-disclosure with lack of consent oversimplifies the complex and diverse nature 
of consent.”49  
There is another approach to autonomy that is equally consistent with the 
Ewanchuk/JA consent principles. Autonomy is not only about how others use us 
for their own ends. Autonomy is also based on how we use our own agency. In my 
view, recognizing that HIV positive and negative individuals have shared agency in 
intimate encounters better promotes personal autonomy and sexual integrity than 
a unilateral disclosure obligation. This shared agency can find legal expression in 
parallel obligations to ask about and to disclose HIV status. I will refer to these 
joint obligations as the shared responsibility model.  
In Cuerrier, the SCC did not seriously question whether it would be appropriate 
to impose some type of legal obligation on individuals to ask about their partner’s 
HIV status. While the majority emphasized that everyone needs to take responsi-
bility for their own health, it went on to hold that the disclosure responsibility 
“cannot be lightly shifted to unknowing members of society who are wooed, pur-
sued and encouraged by infected individuals to become their sexual partners.”50 
In Mabior, the SCC engaged with the issue in a manner that requires critical re-
flection. When considering the “active misrepresentation approach” to HIV non-
disclosure, Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the Court, touched on one of the 
central issues underlying any recognition of a duty to ask: why should it matter 
whether the complainant asked? From the complainant’s perspective, what matters 
is that she would not have consented to sexual relations had she known about the 
accused’s HIV positive status. The Chief Justice seems rightly concerned with dis-
advantaging some complainants who because of trust, naivety, fear or some other 
                                                                                                                                                         
47 Ibid at 483 [emphasis in original].  
48 See e.g. Mabior, supra note 1 at para 48.  
49 Cuerrier, supra note 7 at para 49.  
50 Ibid at para 144.  
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reason did not ask their partner about his or her sexual health.51 In my view, these 
concerns are less about recognizing a duty to ask and more about signalling the 
need for caution in determining the scope and effect of that legal obligation.  
There are three main reasons why the shared responsibility model is preferable 
to Mabior’s unilateral disclosure obligation. First, the one-sided disclosure obliga-
tion is based on a troubling view of sexual autonomy. Second, the shared responsi-
responsibility model will help reduce the stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS. Finally, 
recognizing joint obligations will encourage people to take ownership of their own 
sexual practices. I will address each of these points in turn.  
A one-sided disclosure obligation risks reinstating dangerous myths and gender 
stereotypes by reducing all individuals to passive participants in the sexual encoun-
ter who lack the agency to take steps to protect their own health. This 
impoverished view of sexual autonomy runs counter to the goal of empowering 
individuals, contributes to gender inequality and undermines the subjective con-
sent standard.52 
The shared responsibility model overcomes many of these shortcomings by 
taking the agency of both partners in the sexual encounter more seriously. HIV 
negative individuals can have as much or as little agency as HIV positive ones in 
sexual relationships. Accordingly, the law should give relevance to what each part-
ner does or does not do.  
The stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS still exists in Canada. In a 2012 survey, 48 
percent of respondents said that they would not be comfortable drinking from the 
same restaurant glass as someone with HIV and 24 percent said they would not be 
comfortable with even wearing a sweater that was once worn by someone with the 
infection.53 In addition, 36 percent of the respondents said that they would not be 
comfortable with their child attending the same school as someone with HIV.54  
The unilateral disclosure obligation exacerbates this stigma. It places all of the 
blame for exposure or transmission on HIV positive individuals and constructs 
them as irresponsible, dangerous and subversive.55 The one-sided obligation cre-
ates an “us versus them dichotomy” that reinforces the social “undesirability” of 
HIV and by extension, the “undesirability” of those living with it.56  
In contrast, a parallel legal duty to ask helps combat stigma by shifting the dis-
course away from blame and towards mutual responsibility. A focus on mutual 
responsibility will help break down the “us versus them” mentality. Joint obliga-
                                                                                                                                                         
51 Mabior, supra note 1 at para 65.  
52 Richard Elliott & Alison Symington, “Mabior and DC: Is Criminal Law the Answer to Non-
Disclosure?” The Court (February 7th, 2012), online: <http://www.thecourt.ca/2012/02/07/mabior-and-
d-c-is-criminal-law-the-answer-to-non-disclosure-part-2/>. 
53 Ekos Research Associates, 2012 HIV/AIDS Attitudinal Tracking Survey (October 2012) at 66, online: 
<http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pwgsc-tpsgc/por-ef/public_health_agency_canada/2012/072-11/ 
report.pdf >.  
54 Ibid at 66.  
55 Gender of Lying, supra note 31 at 434; Isabel Grant, “The Boundaries of the Criminal Law: the Crimi-
nalization of the Non-disclosure of HIV” (2008) 31 Dalhousie LJ 123 at 163; Alison Symington, “HIV 
Exposure as Assault: Progressive Development or Misplaced Focus?” in Elizabeth A Sheehy, ed, Sexual 
Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 
2012) 635 at 653-654 [HIV Exposure as Assault].  
56 Matthew Cornett, “Criminalization of the Intended Transmission or Knowing Non-Disclosure of 
HIV in Canada” (2011) 5 McGill JL & Health 61 at 72.  
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tions also make clear that the law is not trying to criminalize disease, but rather 
trying to protect an individual’s right to determine who he or she wants to have sex 
with and under what circumstances.  
The shared responsibility model also encourages individuals to take ownership 
of their own sexual practices, which brings the criminal law more in line with pub-
lic health initiatives designed to limit the spread of HIV and other sexually 
transmitted infections. Mabior sends the message that HIV negative individuals do 
not have to take steps to protect themselves against HIV. They can safely rely on 
their partners to either disclose or take the necessary precautions themselves. The 
problem with this approach is that one quarter of those with HIV do not know 
about their infection.57 The one-sided disclosure obligation creates a dangerous 
“false sense of security.”58 The shared responsibility model dislodges this false sense 
of security by requiring individuals to ask their partners about their HIV status. It 
makes clear that individuals need to take responsibility for their own sexual health.  
IV.  Courts will not enforce the duty to ask or the duty to disclose where it 
would be unreasonable to do so  
I have argued that Mabior should have recognized parallel obligations to ask 
about and to disclose HIV status. This shared responsibility model is based on the 
idea that people can and should take ownership of their sexual practices. However, 
it would be a mistake to assume that everyone is able to exercise that degree of per-
sonal autonomy. The duty to ask and the duty to disclose cannot be severed from 
social context and must be considered in light of the lived realities of women. Vio-
lence against women remains a “serious and pervasive” problem.59 In some 
relationships, asking about the status of a partner’s sexual health or disclosing HIV 
status can lead to violence.60 The difficult issue is trying to accommodate this social 
context with the important ends served by the parallel duties.  
Courts should not enforce either the duty to ask or the duty to disclose in situa-
tions where it would be unreasonable to do so. The test of reasonableness strikes 
the proper balance between a standard that is so high that the exception will have 
no practical significance and a standard that is so low that it trivializes these im-
portant obligations. Courts should not enforce unreasonable obligations. The party 
that raises the exception must prove it on the balance of probabilities. These claims 
should generally only succeed where the party did not ask or disclose because of a 
reasonable fear of violence. However, this exception is not limited to situations 
involving violence. For instance, it would be unreasonable to enforce these duties 
on a developmentally delayed individual who is incapable of appreciating them. In 
such a situation, it would not matter that there was no fear of violence.  
                                                                                                                                                         
57 Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network et al, Factum of the Interveners, R v Mabior; R v DC (SCC 
#33976/34094) at para 16.  
58 Ibid.  
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V.  The failure to ask about HIV status will not preclude a conviction, but it 
can be considered  
The remaining question is what happens when an individual does not ask about 
and his or her partner does not disclose HIV positive status before engaging in 
sexual relations.  
One approach is to hold that non-disclosure will not vitiate consent where the 
complainant did not ask the accused about his HIV status. In situations of HIV 
non-disclosure, the court is being asked to legally override consent on the basis that 
the complainant would not have given it had she known. It is arguable that if the 
complainant knows that she will not have sex with an HIV positive person under 
any circumstances, but does not ask the accused about his status, she has no basis 
for claiming that her apparent consent should be vitiated. In other words, if HIV 
status is important enough to vitiate her consent, it should be important enough 
for her to ask about.  
The major advantage of this approach is that it will give real teeth to the duty to 
ask, ensuring that individuals discharge that obligation and its benefits are realized. 
There is no point in recognizing joint obligations if legal consequences only attach 
to the failure to disclose. However, this approach will also have a number of nega-
tive consequences. This approach seems to use notions of sexual autonomy to 
sanction victim blaming. It would deny complainants the protection of the law 
because of their failure to ask and thus sends the message that they were responsi-
ble for their own victimization. In addition, this approach turns autonomy on its 
head by punishing complainants for not exercising their freedom in certain ways. 
Finally, I am concerned that making the failure to ask determinative would further 
discourage complainants from coming forward. It is estimated that 91% of sexual 
assaults go unreported.61 It is unlikely that complainants will report these sexual 
assaults and endure the ordeal of trial if they know that there will not be a convic-
tion unless the Crown can prove that they asked or their situation satisfies a narrow 
legal exception.  
The better approach is to make the failure to ask relevant, but not determina-
tive of whether HIV non-disclosure vitiates consent. The approach should be 
similar to that taken towards consent. In Ewanchuk, the majority held that the ab-
sence of consent is determined by the complainant’s subjective state of mind. 
However, the complainant’s conduct can be considered in assessing her claim that 
she did not subjectively consent. If the trial judge believes the complainant, her 
conduct is irrelevant.62 Similarly, the failure to ask should only be a factor in as-
sessing whether: (i) a reasonable person would have known that HIV status was 
relevant to the complainant’s decision to engage in the sexual activity; (ii) the com-
plainant would still have consented had she known about the accused’s HIV 
positive status; and (iii) the accused was aware that non-disclosure would induce 
the complainant’s consent.63 Thus, even if the complainant did not ask about HIV 
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status, it would still be possible for the trier of fact to find that the accused’s non-
disclosure constitutes fraud, vitiating consent. 
VI.  Counter argument: Joint obligations improperly shift the criminal law’s 
focus  
The strongest argument against the shared responsibility model is that it im-
properly shifts the focus of the criminal law from the actions of the accused to 
those of the complainant.  
The question of whether the complainant asked is arguably not very different 
from questions centred on whether she resisted. It should not matter whether the 
complainant asked, just as it does not matter if she resisted.64 The criminal law 
should be concerned with the accused’s behaviour, not the complainant’s.65  
There is no easy answer to this criticism. In my view, there is a need to treat 
HIV non-disclosure differently because of the immense stigma surrounding sero-
positive individuals. While the shared responsibility model has given legal rele-
vance to the actions of complainants, the failure to ask does not absolve those 
living with HIV of their disclosure obligations. Indeed, the ultimate focus remains 
on whether the accused, irrespective of whether he was asked, should have dis-
closed under the circumstances.  
While the failure to ask informs that consideration, it is not determinative and 
is only one factor to consider. In addition, the shared responsibility model has a 
number of advantages over Mabior’s one-sided disclosure obligation. The shared 
responsibility model promotes sexual autonomy and important health initiatives, 
while combating the stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS. Although this answer is not 
entirely satisfactory, I think that, on balance, the benefits of the shared responsibil-
ity model justify looking at HIV non-disclosure slightly differently.  
This paper has only considered whether there should be a parallel obligation to 
ask about HIV status. I leave open the difficult question of whether there should be 
a similar obligation to ask about other sexually transmitted infections. While HIV 
exceptionalism may create additional stigma, equally troubling is expanding the 
way that the criminal law can properly consider the complainant’s conduct in de-
termining guilt. 
VII. Conclusion  
The SCC’s decisions in Mabior and DC are disappointing. The Court resurrect-
ed the doctrine of implied consent in sexual assault law, created a gendered 
disclosure obligation, severed the issues from social context, and left an unaccepta-
ble amount of uncertainty in the criminal law. The fundamental flaw with Mabior 
is its unilateral disclosure obligation, which is tied to the risk of harm. In affirming 
the appropriateness of this one-sided obligation, the Court showed that it has a 
shallow understanding of autonomy, consent, and the policy underlying the crimi-
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Vol. 22 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 33 
!
nalization of sexual assault. The criminal law should recognize joint obligations to 
ask about and to disclose HIV positive status. These joint obligations promote a 
realistic and empowering view of sexual autonomy, bring the criminal law in line 
with important public health initiatives, and help combat the stigma surrounding 
HIV/AIDS. 
